Fallujah, Iraq. A normal mid morning on 30th March 2004, two badly damaged Mitsubishi Pajero jeeps and two empty trucks laid by the roadside bellowing smoke, dead American bodies dragged by balaclava Iraqi insurgents, one dead body was chopped up and an Iraqi teenager kicked a Caucasian human head in disgust as if he was Cristiano Ronaldo trying to score with a free kick. That fateful day, four civilian military contractors of Blackwater Corporation died in midst of a fire-fight with Iraqi Sunni insurgents.
The incident happened when the rear escorting vehicle encountered a grenade thrown from the roadside and into the path as it came to a standstill with the slowing of the traffic. A loud explosion followed immediately by machine gun fire ripping the vehicles. Two of the American contractors, escorting at the rear, had no chance immediately upon the grenade explosion and from the oncoming machine gun fire. As for the front escort vehicle, the American driver was dead as the vehicle rammed (head on) into the rear of another unidentified vehicle; despite his partner, the navigator, was impaled by oncoming bullets, he did manage to survive the briefly, before insurgents dragged his body from the wrecked vehicle. Badly injured, the navigator pled for his life, the raging and unconcerned insurgent ended his life with a bullet. Their duties on that day were to escort forks, spoons, pots and pans for an event to be held in Baghdad. With the deaths of the private military contractors, it’s the beginning of a new insurgent war with the Americans in Iraq. The insurgents filmed the scene and sent it to Al Jazeera as a message to the American occupiers.
This article will examine what exactly happened on that fateful day and the reason as to why Blackwater, a successful corporation in security management, became a pariah corporation and its downfall.
There are many instances on which Blackwater perpetuate incidents some commendable but many resulted in litigation. For example, this article will not touch on Najaf, Iraq and the massacre in Baghdad where four Blackwater security contractors fired 70 rounds into a passenger car. This article is not an examination of how force was being used by security contractors although it’s an interesting development after the Fallujah madness. No, this article will only examine the crisis management and the failure of management to address issues on the Fallujah massacre and the Blackwater 61’s crash.
As a security corporation tasks with securing the lives of diplomats, oil facilities, infrastructure projects, intelligence operations, etc., its most criteria in any security management and objective in any situation is to conduct a threat assessment risk analysis.
The first thing here is to substantiate whether such an operation deemed sufficient security personnel to conduct this task? There were four named civilian security personnel by Blackwater to conduct the escort. Would four persons be actually sufficient to conduct such a high risks escort over such a highly unsecured and murderous zone outside of the Baghdad’s Green Zone? By right even in an armed escort for cash-in-transit (CIT), anywhere in the world in peaceful times, there’s a need for 3 to 4 men security escort; a driver, an (armed) navigator, and one or two armed security escorts in the locked vault cabin.
The Blackwater escort had two security personnel; a driver and an (armed) navigator. Supposedly, there should be one more security personnel to man a heavy SAW machine gun with a 180-degree scope to mow down any attacker, especially from behind.
Secondly, any American security personnel that conduct operations outside of the Baghdad Green Zone were armed to the teeth and protected with armour. Blackwater military contractors were not; firstly, they did not carry sufficient firepower. With no gunner to hold down the insurgents during a fire fight and they were as good as dead. Secondly, their vehicles were not armoured to prevent machine gun fire – a 5.56mm bullet could easily tear through the metal finishings of a Mitsubishi Pajero (which was a suit up Sport Utility Vehicle [SUV]) and could instantly killed occupants within.
Thirdly, was the assignment to escort forks, spoons, pots, pans and various other kitchen utensils that crucial? How come these items cannot be air flown by helicopter flights which was safer and faster? No. Because Blackwater wanted the business, and as such, they quietly lobbied for re-negotiation of the contract, bided lower from another security contractor that perhaps would be air flown, and offered the United States Government prompt escort and security without conditions. The US Government viewed that flying kitchen utensils cost money and Blackwater Corp was a confident security contractor.
Fourthly, did the four security contractors know the route before hand and did they did an analysis of the situation, in an event a situation may occur. Firstly, these four contractors were handed this escorting contract within a day’s notice. This was presumably a promise by Blackwater to the US Government about not having extra pre-conditions and could secure and revert the objective within the time frame and within budgetary measures. Secondly, they did not have any idea at all as they were new in Iraq, except for one who came two months earlier. Most of them did their tours in Afghanistan but not in Iraq. The day before their escort duties, they were given a map designating their destination, Habbaniyah, and their return. They were asked to drive very fast at 140 kilometres per hour. What the four contractors did not know was that a month ago, there was propaganda (by the Sunnis) about a top spiritual Hamas leader, Sheik Yassin, assassinated by the Israeli military in Gaza. Enraged, Sunni resistance fighters (with allegiance to Hamas) massacred some twenty-three Iraqi police officers and allowed detainees to escape in February 2004.
In response, the First US Marines expeditionary force took over responsibility from the Eighty-Second Airborne, their intentions were to enter Fallujah established dominance and restored order. Their objective was to defeat the insurgents and resistance fighters. Fallujah residents upon knowing the hardship imposed could be brutal, many residents left, leaving those who were unable to travel and cores of resistance fighters and insurgents.
When the Marines entered Fallujah, suddenly they were engaged in street to street battles for two days. In the end, one Marine was killed, seven wounded and fifteen Iraqis killed and among them, an American TV cameramen and a two-year-old Iraqi child. Those residents who did not leave Fallujah were left with no harsh choices: fled like the rest to other nearby cities; or died fighting like the rest.
The Sunnis became angry, brazen (over the incident), defiant, emboldened and informed fellow Sunnis that there were CIA personnel travelling through Fallujah on that day. What the Sunni militiamen did not know was the fact that these were not the US Army or the Marines, government officials, or the CIA, but armed civilian contractors securing and escorting kitchen utensils. Not knowing about a hot political and social situation to be embroiling and erupting, the four military contractors walked into a minefield – basically signing their suicide death contracts.
Fifth, as the time was too short even to know and plan for the route and its various choke points of ingress and egress; the security contractors just took the risks and knowingly that they were paid and they had little choice. For any vehicular security and escort arrangement, the first rule of thumb is to know the route before hand and where is the best place to take if security contractors feel uncomfortable with the route. If the contractors had known of the political and social issues surrounding Fallujah, they could have avoided the city altogether and may have driven into the desert avoiding the towns. But they did not know. Secondly, vehicular escorts should be able to change its route to avoid unscrupulous detection and becoming a target, especially in places like Iraq. But since the four military contractors were new to Iraq, they did not even have the proper knowledge of where and what were available and the optimum options of viability. Without decent knowledge, the military contractors were blindsided.
Perhaps to them, if worst come to worst then, they have to make the best out of a bad situation. They were supposed to be rough, tough, and sought as an image of superiority to their company’s mission and vision. Unfortunately, that masochistic missionary and visionary resolve ended in terrible bloodshed.
Darth Vader economics
Despite the Fallujah debacle created a real mess for Blackwater, this first incident actually was a blessing in disguise for Blackwater’s owner and founder, Mr. Erik Prince. He managed to turn the tables, convinced the Republican dominated Congress in the United States to increase and fund more Blackwater operations. Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld and various other Congressmen and Senators whom have interest in Blackwater and the privatization of the military forged ahead with this “military industrial complex.” Despite there were also investigations and tort actions coming from the four families of the dead military contractors, Blackwater did not seem to edge much from their philosophy of fattening the organization and as well as fattening some of the top and influential people in the private military business. Despite many of us thought Iraq is about powerful nations grabbing up petrol dollars, it’s not; the sea of oil was security contracting – it’s a multibillion industry where a security contractor can be paid between US$500 – US$750 a day (excluding allowances). The lure of security “gold rush” contracting was so aggressive that in 2008 there were some 50 security firms in Iraq itself from various countries but notably most were allied partners in the war against Saddam Hussein. Firms like Blackwater became so expeditiously greedy that they diverse and branch into subgroups or franchises (from the parent organization) to take up additional security contracts. Perhaps, war is profit after all. Despite Blackwater’s aggressive intolerance, greed and confident profit margins, that venture did not end out well for Blackwater with their meagre and constantly poor risks security.
On 27th November, 2004, a privately owned turboprop plane on contract with the US Air Force slammed into the Baba Mountain, 14,600 feet high in Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush mountain range. Three US soldiers including the flight engineer were dead upon impact; the two pilots managed to eject from the aircraft, whilst one survived momentarily for a few hours, the other was dead upon ejection.
The crash of Blackwater 61during that year did not receive particular attention as most of the media (during the year) focused on the Fallujah issue on the four dead military contractors. The Fallujah case on the four dead military contractors did not produce a paper trail and the reason being as to why Blackwater Corp was able to sidestep on-going investigations and deceive politicians into giving them more security contracts.
After the death of the four military contractors, the US military became very aggressive and vengeful. Fallujah was almost destroyed and many of its occupants left. Initially, the American military were only fighting the Sunnis but when the Shiites saw their (Sunni) brothers were targeted vengefully, they offered to fight with the Sunnis as well. The revenge aggressiveness opened a can of worms for the American military but soon everywhere in Iraq every Iraqi would rise and challenge the occupation. Because of the intensity of the threats, Blackwater and many security corporations were getting more and more contracts. Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Republican lobbyists and politicians poured hot water over the situation and insisted more private army was the best solution forward. This increase, in private military contracting, also extended to many new and volatile regions like the Caspian Sea environs, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In Afghanistan, Blackwater’s aviation division, Presidential Airways, operated off the public radar, short take off and landing (STOL) aircraft to Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Their clandestine flight operations were sanctioned by the CIA and the Pentagon and that contract alone was worth US$34.8 million for the operations of three CASA aircraft.
So what happened to Blackwater 61 was no fluke. It seemed like a normal air accident due to bad weather approaching from the Baba Mountain but when the US Army Collateral Investigations Board (USACIB) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported were much more than just a bad weather mishap.
Firstly, even though the pilots were experienced flying STOL aircraft in California with the highest peak at 14,495 feet, the Afghan Baba mountain ranges are crisscrossed and the highest peak can be as high as 25,000 feet. Pilots need to know these mountain ranges in order to make the proper and precise steep climb.
Secondly, there was limited communication with other aircraft and no air-traffic control to guide planes should they encounter a patch of clouds or other bad weather and Afghanistan has incredibly variable weather especially near the mountains. “Thus pilots have only to opt with what they called “visual flight rules” – in other words, pilots were on their own with little more than instinct and common sense to guide them.”
Thirdly, flying in Afghanistan is low-tech to the point where pilots often had to use satellite phones to report locations when they landed anywhere but even then satellite phones were not reliable as well. Places like Kabul, Bagram, and Shindad only have control towers and once the pilots are out of the 20 mile range (of these cities) the pilots were on their own.
Fourthly, flight training in Melbourne, Florida, was different from flying in Afghanistan. The pilots need to have visible knowledge as Afghanistan does not have the best of communications and the mountain ranges pose challenges to the pilots with incredible variable weather conditions. The Florida training (with its stable climate and wind conditions) basically was only to give the pilots a feel with the various CASA aircrafts. Pilots were not challenged to fly or manoeuvre the plane in a difficult manner like how to fly with “visual flight rules” with undulating mountain ranges. Flight simulation training could suffice this ability.
Fifthly, as the two pilots are new to Afghanistan, they did not have the knowledge of the landscape and distance. Moreover, the pilots were over confident of not bringing a Global Positioning System (GPS) with them. In the flight’s black box recording, both pilot and the co-pilot could be heard assuming which valley route to take and in the end the pilot made a decision by saying, “We’ll just see where this leads.” The pilots made a lot of small talk and from the transcripts from the black box; it seemed they were unconcerned and somewhat uncertain. NTSB concluded that Blackwater’s pilots “were behaving unprofessionally and were deliberately flying nonstandard route low through the valley for ‘fun.’” It further noted that the pilots’ vision and judgment might have been impaired because they were not using oxygen, potential in violation of federal regulations.
Sixth, proper emergent search and rescue (S&R) efforts were visibly absent until the bodies were located 74 hours. Despite S&R efforts could at least save a survivor but since it did not materialize until much later, the lone survivor was not able to sustain and survive his internal bleeding, wounds, and traumatic injuries. The most damaging of all to come out from this is the autopsy report on the lone survivor that pointed out that “Specialist Miller had an absolute minimum survival time of approximately eight hours” after the accident, and if Miller “had received medical assistance with the time frame, followed by appropriate surgical intervention, he most likely would have survived.”
Tort Claims & Compliance
The families of the soldiers institute tort proceedings against Blackwater. Their claims were mainly based on the above sixth points. In fighting the lawsuits, Blackwater adopted a three-pronged approach to argue that it was immune from such litigation. It presented the:
- “Political Question Doctrine” which relied on the idea that “the judiciary properly refrains from deciding controversies that the Constitution textually commits to another political branch and cases are beyond the competence of the courts to resolve because of the lack of judicially manageable standards.” Blackwater insisted that they were part of the “Total Force” and part of the Department of Defense (DOD)’s “warfighting capability and capacity and as such allowing civilian courts to consider questions of liability to soldiers who are killed or injured in operations involving contractors on the battlefield would insert those civilian courts directly into the regulation of military operations.”
The presiding district court judge, Judge John Antoon opined and determined that because Blackwater 61 was “required to fly as [it] normally would, according to commercial, civilian standards, in a foreign, albeit treacherous, terrain” and could refuse to fly any mission they felt too dangerous, “it does not appear…this Court will be called to question any tactical military orders.” As such the court rejected Blackwater’s “political question” argument and the Judge also questioned Blackwater’s contention that if it was part of the military, the federal government could have filed a brief supporting Blackwater in this case but had not…”
- The Feres Doctrine: Under the feres doctrine Blackwater postured that it as part of the Total Force was immune from tort suits for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” It argued that “it is inconsequential here that the decedents died in the aircraft hired by the Air Force, rather than in an aircraft operated by the Air Force – what matters is that they were military personnel who died while on war duty.”
Judge Antoon clarified with Blackwater’s interpretation of a straightforward immunity granted to the military, pointing out that Blackwater’s legal team “cite no case in which the Feres doctrine has been held applicable to private contractors.” He said Blackwater/Presidential Airways “essentially mask their request for this Court to stretch Feres beyond its established and logical bounds by citing cases which emphasize that it is the plaintiff’s status as a member of the military and not the status of [Blackwater] that is significant.” Concluding, he noted that Blackwater was not entitled to protection under the Feres doctrine because they are private commercial entities….Blackwater entered into the contract as a commercial endeavour; they provided for a price. Simply because the service was provided in the mountains of Afghanistan during armed conflict does not render the Blackwater, or their personnel, members of the military or employees of Government. In another words, the judge determined that though the Pentagon might have referred to private military contractors as part of its “Total Force,” that did not change Blackwater’s status as a forward profit private company responsible for its actions.
- Exception to Federal Tort Claims Act. Blackwater final argument for immunity from tort lawsuits was that, as a military contractor, it is immune from such litigation in the same way that certain producers of complex military equipment have been found to be immune. Blackwater referenced a case in which the family of a dead Marine sued a manufacturer for defects in its design of a helicopter escape system. The Court in that case concluded that “state tort law was preempted by the government’s profound interest in procuring complex military equipment” and that the government had the “discretion to prioritize combat effectiveness over safety designing military equipment.”
The Judge decided that although that defense exists and has been extended in some instances, there is no “authority for bestowing a private actor with the shield of sovereign immunity. Until Congress directs otherwise, private, non-employee contractors are limited” to exceptions like that involving the design of complex equipment. Judge Antoon’s was sceptical that combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, that preserves the US Government’s traditional sovereign immunity from liability, has any application to suits against private defense contractors. At most it only shields private defense contractors for products liability claims involving complex sophisticated equipment used during times of war. It has never been extended to bar suits alleging active negligence by contractors in the provision of services, and as such the Judge did not extend that privilege.
The district court judge basically denied every single motion made by Blackwater to stop discovery and dismiss the case, and, as expected, Blackwater immediately began the appellate process in late September 2006. By then, Blackwater was beginning to embroil in many of the negligent suits and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were rallying against the activities of Blackwater. They are in fact worried by the prospect private military contractors holding too much unchecked power and they could at will conduct military operations that are against domestic and international laws and international norms.
The problem with Blackwater is that the management wanted many more private military projects but the company refused to enhance its compliance and safety issues. For them, and especially, for Mr. Erik Prince, by conducting compliance and implementing safety measures, slow things down. Mr. Erik Prince is a retired SEAL professional and threats to special operation soldiers like him are the last thing on his mind. A soldier is supposed to stand up, hold down the fort, and fight to the last bullet. Soldiers are basically casualties of war and issues like compliance and safety are the last thing on their mind. He wanted his private army to be that determined and risk all risks.
By October 2007, Blackwater USA became Blackwater Worldwide, the Blackwater logo that was once a crosshair became a bear paw; a less aggressive notion of private military contracting. The company was also forced to be more compliant and transfer a number of their contract work to other security contracting companies. Then in July, 2008, Blackwater Worldwide shifted its resources from security contracting because of the extensive risks in that sector. CEO and founder Erik Prince told the Associated Press during a daylong visit to Blackwater’s North Carolina compound that “The experience we’ve had would certainly be a disincentive to any other companies that want to step in and put their entire business at risk.”
In February 2009, Blackwater Worldwide would change its name again to Xe Services LLC as part of the company’s restructuring programme. This change is nothing new because Blackwater Worldwide incurred numerous tort actions and suits from various parties. And the new Obama Administration was looking into inappropriate proprieties of the Bush Administration as well as those contracts that seem to drain federal government and taxpayers. This has a lot to do for Blackwater (whether it’s USA or Worldwide) and part of the guarantee for Blackwater’s survival was to institute a serious corporate governance and ethics program and the establishment of an independent committee of outside experts to supervise the compliance structures. One of the guarantees to Erik Prince was he resigned as CEO and he would remain as Chairman of the Board and no longer involved in Xe Services LLC running of operations. Joseph Orio was brought on as new CEO and President replacing Erik Prince and Gary Jackson. Joseph Orio would resolve legal issues and agreed to implement the number of compliance and audit measures.
In December 2009, Erik Prince further relinquished all his responsibilities of the Board and decided to become a trainer again. But that did not last long too and in late 2010, Erik moved to Abu Dhabi and started another security services company called Reflex Responses. This venture was part and parcel of United Arab Emirates Royalty’s signature and Abu Dhabi wanted a strong private military force in addition to its Armed Forces.
In 2010, a group of private investors led by former Republican Administration officials and ex-Cabinet officials would resolve the debts owed through litigation and legal wrangling with various contractual companies as well. This group of investors paid up every debt and capital and renamed the company ACADEMI. They hired their own CEO and brought in a compliance and regulator chief.
In 2014, Academi and Triple Canopy merged with several other companies within the Constellis Group to from Constellis Group Holdings, Inc. This renewed partnership brought together an array of security companies including Triple Canopy, Constellis Ltd., Strategic Social, Tidewater Global Services, National Strategic Protective Services, ACADEMI Training Center, and International Development Solutions.
Wet Works’ Dreams: A Security Desire
Despite all these changes… Erik Prince’s name is still listed as the founder of the whole setup.
Albeit he sidestepped all those risks to make a name for himself – his desire is not about making money but wanting to spread military justice, defeat oppressors, and showed the world that force is the détente. He wanted a force that’s available within a moment’s notice and engages aggression. But his notions are contorted, and that can only happen in a country where the rule of law is not pervasive and there’s only an authoritarian ruler and rule with impunity.
Many democratic countries disallowed his notion of militarism and can never be objectively viable. Security management is about managing risks and not about building a military industry and having a military industrial complex. With great power comes great responsibility. People are not machines and have the will to understand what’s right and wrong in the midst. Staff working in an organization, have families, loved ones, friends and community to go to. The wrongful dead can rise and challenge not by them but by their families.
Despite Erik’s desire wanting to spread military justice but there are many who are not thinking like he does. They have a different view of military justice – justice for profit. Private prisons, private security forces, etc. have been around for more than 2 decades and it’s no longer something new. The problem when something becomes profit based, greed, starts to jump in as well – this is just a natural phenomenon. A healthy industry is one that’s making money not in debt or falling into bankruptcy. But when profits becomes obsessed, so does abuse as well and many security organizations start shirking responsibilities and cutting corners. This is a problem and that’s what happened to Blackwater eventually. It’s only when people start dying in numbers or sensationalised stories becoming headlines of the media. So is this enough?
There are rumours in the social media that Erik is not only organising a force in UAE but is training a multinational force in the Arabian Peninsula. That force could be the one send in by the Saudis to try and defeat the Houthis, at the moment. So if the Saudis are successful, Erik will be a desirable security entrepreneur for many hot countries who want him to start private multinational forces – the new military raison d’être.
 Fallujah is one of the cities in Iraq in which the majority of the population in the city are Sunnis and a hotbed of insurgency because of their loyalty to Saddam Hussein.
 Scahill, Jeremy (2007). Chapter Six: The Ambush in Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. New York, NY, US.: Nation Books. Pp. 91-104.
 Despite Fallujah and Blackwater 61 perhaps were pioneer litigation issues, apparently these litigation suits changed the frameworks and mindsets of the organization and Erik was very much in control with his lobbying, Christian influence, and Republican networks. As such these two cases stalled, pretty much. Najaf and Baghdad massacres by security contractors on innocent Iraqis posed major questions about their roles and legalities and whether they were authorized to use force offensively. Their roles were supposed to be protecting diplomats and diplomats convoys and they were not allowed to open fire indiscriminately even the situation did not warrant sufficient security. As such families, NGO litigation groups like Centre for Constitutional Rights filed Aliens Tort Claims Act on behalf for Iraqi families. Then there are still criminal charges brought on by the Obama Administration and as well as the Iraqi Government.Erik Prince was forced to attend a congressional hearing in 2nd October 2007 on a multitude of issues notably allowing the Andrew Moonen to flee after the shooting death of an Iraqi vice presidential guard. Erik retorted, “We can’t flog him and we can’t incarcerate him,” – meaning Andrew was a private contractor and immune to prosecution and tort liabilities. It’s true that until the end of 2007, the Iraqi Government did not have powers and legitimacy against Blackwater security contractors. When Obama Administration came into the White House, one of his main agenda was the systematic withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and also disallowed private contractors the legitimacy to operate unless under approval. Together with the ex-Maliki Government, the security contractors are either disallowed to operate without legitimacy or had their responsibilities shackled.
ACADEMI, Wikipedia 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academi
 Bahari, Ramli (2013). Crisis Management.
 British Retail Consortium Cash and Valuables in Transit Working Group (2011). Cash and Valuables in Transit: Best Practice Guidelines for Retailers, 2nd Ed. London, England.: British Retail Consortium. http://www.g4s.uk.com/~/media/Files/United%20Kingdom/Cash%20Solutions/CVIT_Best_Practice_2nd_Edition.pdf
 Scahill, Ibid. p. 98
 Ibid. p. 102
 Ibid. p. 102
 Ibid. p. 88
 Ibid. p. 93
 Ibid. pp. 92-93
 North Carolina Department of Transportation (2009). Prior Driving of Route in Certified Escort Vehicle Operator Handbook. NCDOT p. 3-2. https://connect.ncdot.gov/business/trucking/Documents/EVOManual.pdf
 Eisenhower, Dwight D (1961). Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961. http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/indust.html.
 Bones, Alicia: Demand Media (2014). Woman-the nest: How Much Money Do Private Military Contractors Get Paid? http://woman.thenest.com/much-money-private-military-contractors-paid-23196.html
 Singer, P. W. (2008). Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Cornell University Press. p. 243.
 Scahill, Ibid. p. 239.
 Ibid. p. 240.
 Ibid. p. 247.
 Ibid. p. 248.
 Ibid. pp. 249-250.
 Ibid. pp. 249-250.
 Ibid. p. 250.
 Ibid. p. 250.
 Ibid pp. 251-252.
 Ibid. pp. 251-252.
 Ibid. pp. 251-252.
 Ibid. p. 252.
 Ibid. p.252.
 Ibid. p. 252.
 Ibid. p. 252.
 Ibid. p. 253.
 Ibid. ACADEMI. Wikipedia..
 Ibid. Wikipedia.
 Ibid. Wikipedia.
 Hager, Emily B. and Marzetti, M. Secret Desert Force Set Up By Blackwater Founder, New York Times, May 14, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html
 Ibid. ACADEMI. Wikipedia..
 Ibid. Wikipedia.
 Ibid. ACADEMI. Wikipedia.
 IMDB. Spider-Man (2002). http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0145487/quotes